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With Temperate Rod:
Maintaining Academic Order in
Secondary Schools
By ARNoLD TAYLOr*
Fon-wou
We are living in an era of truculence, especially among our
youth. The truculent spirit is manifested in street dashes, campus
disturbances, and classroom confrontations in our secondary
schools. Both the action and reaction of, and to, these pupil
protestations are as contemporary as the latest news bulletin. It
is against this background of current conflict that the following
article by Arnold Taylor on the authority and means of school
officials to discipline secondary school pupils comes of age at
the very hour of its literary birth.
I have become acutely aware of rapidly changing concepts
not only in education proper, but also in the response of people,.
both pupils and parents, to established truisms of the past. These
changing concepts are evident not only in the school, but also in
the home. When I was a boy in the foothills of Lewis County,
Kentucky, my grandmother wore her nightcap when she went
to bed, she didn't take it. Friends would drop in for a call; now
they call in for a drop. When a boy was in the principal's office,
it meant the boy was in trouble. Now when a boy is in the
principal's office, it means the principal is in trouble.
School administrators are confronted with a myriad of vexing
problems running the gamut from pupil attire to violent physical
attacks on both persons and property. Long hair, love beads,
scooter skirts, short dresses, berets, beards, sex education, and
sex without education have, and are, creating astronomical challenges to school officials across the country-challenges which
* Member of the Kentucky Bar Association; J.D., Univ. Kentucky, 1965;
Member of the firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, and Cetrulo, Covington, Kentucky.
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not only would tax the wisdom of Solomon, but also would
sorely tempt the patience and long suffering of Job.
Problems of this nature and magnitude are no strangers to
secondary school administrators in Kentucky. Pupil demonstrations and disturbances in our secondary public schools have
occurred this school year in Northern Kentucky, Jefferson County,
and the Jackson Purchase. Other serious outbreaks have been
averted by prompt and proper action of local school officials.
Unfortunately, this may not be the end, but merely the commencement-only the beginning of the beginning.
It is imperative that school officials better acquaint themselves
with the rudimentary requirements of the law. It is equally imperative that the courts establish these prerequisites in clear
and cogent terms so that order and decorum may be maintained
in the classroom as well as in the courtroom. It is to this desirable
objective that I believe Mr. Taylor has fashioned his article.
The article contains an examination of the law on school discipline as it now exists; its application to both teachers and
pupils; and possible legislative amendments to strengthen and
improve this vital area of human relations.
I am sure that this article will be of interest not only to the
members of the Bench and the Bar, but also to many of our
secondary school administrators, especially those pursuing courses
of study in our graduate schools. I would be more than willing
to, and do, recommend it to their attention.
Ray Corns**
** Director of the Division of Legal Services, Kentucky Dept. of Education; A.B., Berea College; J.D., Cumberland University School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION

Foolishness is bound in the heart of a child; but the rod of
correction shall drive it far from him.
Proverbs 22:15
Biblical injunctions aside, this article will examine the extent
to which secondary school authorities, particularly those in Kentucky, may regulate the behavior, activities and attitudes of thei
students. While certain of the legal principles described in this
paper may well be applicable to other phases of the educational
spectrum, it should be understood that this article does not attempt an application of those principles to grade school or university students. However, the article does intend to encompass
all secondary schools, public or private.
The right of the school authorities to administer discipline is
clearly a subject deserving discussion. Simply because student unrest has arisen mainly in the universities does not mean that
seeds of disorder do not exist among people of high school age;
their normal restiveness is support enough for this proposition.
Youthful resentment of authority is always present, and society
spends much time devising ways of keeping that antagonism at
bay. But repression is never complete, and rebellion will eventually break out. The difference occurs in form: some destroy,
others content themselves with aural or visual shock. The school
authorities then exert their controls by imposing upon the individual the norms of the school community as interpreted by the
authorities. Is this anything less than law enforcement? Yet, if
we call this law enforcement, we presuppose a supporting body
of rules and standards by which to judge the act. But if definite
standards are created, the school authorities must be bound, as
well as benefited, by them. So, the teacher, the superintendent,
or the board members must be made aware of the extent to which
he may exert disciplinary pressure, not only to enable him to
preserve an academic atmosphere while honoring students' rights,
but also for self-protection.
This, then, is the purpose of this article: first, to describe the
law as it is; next, to inspect the effects of those legal rules upon
school authorities, as well as students; and finally, to make some
recommendations, on both a theoretical and practical level, with
a view toward benefiting the parties involved. Initially, this
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article will discuss the jurisdictional bases by which school
authorities are deemed to have disciplinary rights over students.
Section II will deal with the types of activities which have been
held by the courts to be subject to regulation. Section III will
discuss the possible means of discipline at the authorities' disposal, while Section IV will detail the penalties which may be
levied upon the individual for improperly punishing a student.
Finally, certain recommendations will be propounded.
I. THE SCHOOL AurTHonrms' JuBismDrioN

A. Theoretical Bases
1. Generally
There are six traditional theories on which school authorities'
power to administer punishment in the maintenance of order
may be based.
Consent of the parent. There may exist some contractual or
other agreement, express or implied, between the school and the
parent on behalf of the child. Thus, school regulations published
in catalogues may be considered part of a contract between the
parent and the school. There are several criticisms of this theory,
but the basic fault in a contractual approach is that the parties
do not in fact deal at arms length, and do not truly stand as
equals.' Such a doctrine is an anomaly, since courts daily
relieve people of obligations imposed upon them by persons in a
dominant position.
Statutory authorization.Conceivably, the state may create an
entirely new relationship between the teacher and student by injecting itself into the situation, enacting statutory authorization
for jurisdiction over the student. For example, Kentucky Revised
Statutes (hereinafter KRS) 160.290(2) allows a school board to
enact regulations governing the conduct of pupils, and further
provides that these regulations, although they must be consistent
with the general school laws of the State, shall be binding on
' See Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary
Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643 (1966). Goldman's fiduciary theory is found workable
in the secondary as well as university campus and utilized extensively in the
author's subsequent recommendations. See text accompanying notes 118 et. seq.
infra.
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the board of education and parties dealing with it. But the positivistic approach is insufficient, for the existence of some power
is not arguable. The clash occurs when the questions begin to
become: what power and how much power? A statute could even
answer these questions if specific enough, but it can never provide
justification for power through mere articulation. It will never
tell us why the legislature or the legislature's delegate has the
power to forbid one thing but must accept another, why it may
punish this act one way but must move differently with others.
Consent of the pupil. Clearly, where the student himself has
agreed that he shall be subject to regulation, the school authorities
would effectively have that power. Although there might be
some question as to the capacity of the student, by reason of his
lack of majority, it would be especially effective in those cases
where the student is of legal age. In Kentucky, of course, this
theory might be useful in connection with high schools simply because eighteen is the statutory age of majority for most purposes.
But this would not be the case in all jurisdictions, and even in
Kentucky it would probably be useful only for pupils in their
senior year of high school. Inevitably, however, this theory fails,
for such consent could easily be withdrawn, and, more importantly, the student does not negotiate the terms of his admission on equal footing with the school.
Quasi-judicialcapacity. It has been said that the teacher acts
in a role not unlike that of a judicial authority, creating in him
certain immunities and privileges of disciplinary action. This
would not seem distinct from the next theory, the doctrine of
in loco parentis.
In loco parentis. By far the most popular theory is that the
teacher stands in loco parentisto the student. Although the term
is often used, the dissection of this doctrine, both under Kentucky law and that of other jurisdictions, reveals that its meaning
is not as clear as is usually assumed.
There was no generally accepted common law definition of the
phrase, in loco parentis. In Thomas v. United States,' using the
natural and ordinary definition, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that one standing in loco parentis has assumed the status of
2 189 F.2d 494 (6th Cir. 1951).
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a lawful parent by accepting the obligations incident to the
parental relationship without going through the formalities necessary for a legal adoption.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has applied a similar definition. In Rudd v. Fineberg'sTrustee,' the Court stated:
One who stands to a child in loco parentis is bound for its
maintenance, care, and education, and entitled to its services.4
In another case, Brummitt v. Commonwealth,5 it was held that a
stepfather, voluntarily taking his wife's child into the family,
places himself in loco parentis and assumes an obligation to maintain and support the child having no income of his own, the
relationship being substantially the same as that of parent and
child.
These definitions of in loco parentis are ones commonly applied. In defense of the theory it can only be said that it presents
a convenient and expedient vehicle for imputing to the teacher
certain of the parent's rights with few of the responsibilities. This
seems to be Dean Prosser's view of the theory's validity, as he
demonstrates the fallacy of such an argument.
It is sometimes said that the parent, by sending the child to
school, has delegated his discipline to the teacher; but since
many children go to public school under compulsion of law,
and the child may well be punished over the objection of the
parent, a sounder reason is the necessity for maintaining
order in and about the school.6
The C6urt of Appeals has implicitly admitted that in loco
parentis could not be used in the teacher-student relationship
within the doctrinal purity. The Court has expressed the view that
teachers stand in loco parentis only in a general way.7 This supports the notion that the doctrine is used more for ease than accuracy, and that the Court of Appeals does not intend to be
bound by logical extension of an application of pure in loco
parentis doctrine where absurd results would be reached.
The nuisances caused by the application of in loco parentis to
3 277 Ky. 505, 126 S.W.2d 1102 (1939).
4 Id. at 507, 126 S.W.2d at 1103.
5 857 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1962).
6 W. PnossER, LAw OF TORTS § 27 (3d ed. 1964).
7 Board of Educ. v. Luster, 282 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1955).
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the student-teacher relationship are basically twofold. First, there
are technical criticisms created by difficulties in definition.
Secondly, there are possibilities of conflict between the disciplinary approaches of the teacher and the parent.
As a matter of technicality, application of the rule in a pure
form would impose upon teachers certain responsibilities which
none would really wish to assume. For example, they would have
to accept the obligation of support, education and maintenance
of the child. Furthermore, to say that the teacher is in loco
parentisimplies that the parent has given up rights to services of
the child, which the parent would certainly not wish to do. This
technical problem is eliminated by allowing more than one person
to be in loco parentis to a child, but the necessity of this proviso
makes it clear that the application of the pure theory is impossible. The rule not being applicable to the teacher-student
relationship, the courts have modified the doctrine with respect to
teachers, by employing it only in part, that is, to the right of the
teacher to regulate the student. In fact, there is little evidence
that the doctrine was ever intended to be used outside those areas
where the one standing in loco parentiswas to have responsibility
for support and maintenance, i.e., guardians or masters of apprentices.
There are other technical objections. If the doctrine amounts
to no more than a temporary delegation of parental powers,
logic would dictate that the parent could forbid punishment. This
would seem the necessary result whether the parent had expressly
or impliedly delegated his authority. Yet, the doctrine as applied
does not include this logical extension of the rule.
Aside from legal niceties, there are strong possibilities of conflict between the regulatory desires of the teacher and parent.
Where a conflict arises (activity at home affecting the school or
an order of the parent relative to the school) the theory finnishes
no means of resolving the conflict. Both teacher and parent should
have a fairly definite zone of influence, and in loco parentisdoes
nothing to establish these zones. It provides that the teacher has
certain rights of discipline, but it does not itself describe or effectively limit those rights either in substance or in scope. That
is left to other rules, which, it will be shown, strike their own
limits and effect criteria for limitation.
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For all these reasons the theory in loco parentis is largely
irrelevant, as it neither says what privilege of punishment the
teacher wields, nor enables us to calculate the extent of the
privilege. It holds that the teacher is in fact more limited than
the parent in matters of discipline, but the impossibility of
equating parental rights with the teachers' demonstrates the
equal impossibility of fully applying the doctrine of in loco
parentis.
2. In Kentucky
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has expressed two concepts
of jurisdiction of the school over the pupil in disciplinary matters.
In Gott v. Berea College," the school authorities were considered
to stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral welfare and mental training of their pupils. Thus, it was held that the
authorities of Berea College could enact regulations for the
government of their pupils for any purpose subject to parental
governance. In Casey County Board of Education v. Luster,9 the
Court of Appeals referred to teachers and officials of public
schools as standing in loco parentis to their pupils "in a general
way." At first glance, then, it appears that Kentucky employs the
well-worn doctrine of in loco parentis as a basis of jurisdiction.
But a second basis for jurisdiction was set forth in Kentucky Military Institute v. Bramblet, ° wherein the Court held that the
plaintiff, by entering his son as a student in the school, was bound
by its published catalogue which contained prohibitions of certain
activities. The Court held that it was the duty of the son to obey
all reasonable rules and regulations adopted by the managers of
the school for the control of students. Indeed, the Court had
initiated this implied contract theory in Gott in pointing out
that a college or university may prescribe requirements for admission, as well as rules for conduct, and anyone entering as a
student impliedly agrees to conform to those rules."
8 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913). It will be noted that this case deals
with a college and makes reference to colleges and universities, whereas this
article began by eliminating universities from consideration. There is no real
contradiction, as the principles enunciated in Gott are basic ones, generally applied by other urisdictions. Unfortunately, there is no Kentucky case stating
these rules and dealing only with secondary schools.

9 282 S.W.2d 833 (Ky. 1955).

10 158 Ky. 205, 164 S.W. 808 (1914).

11 It should be noted that in Gott the Court also stated that such rules for
admission are viewed more critically where the institution is supported in whole
or in part by appropriations from the public treasury.
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Finally, the statutory authorization found in KRS § 160.
290(2), previously mentioned, should be kept in mind.
B. Enactment And Application Of Disciplinary Regulations
In turning the examination to the legal principles which
determine the validity of rules and regulations passed by a
school board for the government of the school essentially two
issues are raised. Initially, the propriety of the rule itself comes
into question. Secondly, a Court will examine the manner of enforcement of the rule in determining whether the type of action
taken against the pupil was proper.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has used various approaches
in an attempt to formulate a single principle to be used in determining the validity of a rule itself. Arbitrary and unreasonable
regulations will not be enforced. 2 Nor will rules of admission or
conduct be enforced if those rules are unlawful or against public
policy.13 It has also been stated that the school could make any
betterment of pupils that a parent could
rule or regulation for the
4
purpose.'
same
for the
While arbitrariness and unreasonableness are always arguable
criteria, certainly a regulation imposing no standard or guidelines
upon the enforcing agency, thereby giving the pupil no gauge
by which to guide his activities, is unreasonable and arbitrary. 15
It has also been held that permanent exclusion from the school
is arbitrary and unreasonable.' The crucial point is that the
reasonableness of the rule or regulation is a question of law for
the Court, although whether the pupil in fact violated the rule
is for the jury to decide.'
The maintenance of discipline in a public school is generally
committed to the discretion of the school board, and the courts
will usually not interfere with the discretion of school authorities
in the enforcement of a proper regulation.' But where the board,
12 Board of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1964).
13 Kentucky Military Institute v. Bramblet, 158 Ky. 205, 164 S.W. 808
(1914). The same standards may apply to private secondary schools since they
apply to private colleges. See Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204
(1913).
14 Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
15Board of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1964).
16 See Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 996 (1967).
1
Carr v. Wright, 423 S.W.2d 521 (Ky. 1968); Kentucky Military Institute
v. Bramblet, 158 Ky. 205, 164 S.W. 808 (1914).
Is Board of Educ. v. Luster, 282 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. 1955).
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or the official in charge, acts arbitrarily or maliciously in the enforcement of a rule, the court will inquire into the propriety of
that enforcement. 19 Therefore, the court has no power to review
an honest judgment as to whether a pupil was guilty or innocent
of misconduct, and refusal to condone the act or give the pupil
another chance is not arbitrary conduct. Nevertheless, where an
expulsion of a pupil occurs without charge of misconduct, the
court will inquire into such an exercise of power.20 In addition to
the terms "arbitrariness" and "maliciousness," the Court of Appeals has employed the phrase "other improper motives" in
delineating those cases in which it will examine the enforcement
of otherwise proper regulations." It has also stated that the enforcement of a proper rule "for fraudulent purposes" will subject
enforcement to review by the Court.22
C. GeographicalScope of Disciplinary Regulations
Although most instances of misbehavior worrying school
authorities occur on school property, it is not unusual for school
regulations to apply to student activities away from the school
grounds. The legislature has recognized the necessity for a
principle of extraterritoriality of sorts by its enactment of KRS
§ 161.180, which provides:
Each teacher in the public schools shall hold pupils to a
strict account for their conduct in the school, on the way to
and from school, on the playgrounds, and during intermission or recess.
It will be noted that the language of this statute grants the
teacher extraterritorial jurisdiction over the pupil only while the
pupil is on the way to or from school. Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals has adopted a rule whereby reasonable regulation may be
extended even farther. In Gott v. Berea College,23 the Court ap19 Id. See Wilson v. Board of Educ., 807 Ky. 703, 210 S.W.2d 850 (1948);
Byrd v. Begley, 262 Ky. 422, 90 S.W.2d 370 (1936); Board of Educ. v. Booth,

110 Ky. 807, 62 S.W. 872 (1901).
20 Cross v. Board of Trustees, 121 Ky. 469, 89 S.W. 506 (1905). The
appellant's petition was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a cause
of action, but the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. The case was remanded
for trial at which the lower court found against the plaintiff who again appealed.
The second decision of the Court of Appeals is reported at 129 Ky. 35, 110

S.W. 346 (1908), in which the Court affirmed.
21
Cross v. Board of Trustees, 129 Ky. 35, 110 S.W. 346 (1908).
22

Kentucky Military Institute v. Bramblet, 158 Ky. 205, 164 S.W. 808 (1914).

23 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
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provingly quoted authority2 4 to the effect that the power of school
authorities is not confined to the school-room and grounds or to
times while the pupil is on his way to or from school, but extends
to any act which is detrimental to the good order and best interest of the school, whether committed during school hours or
after the student has returned home. The Court did attach the
proviso that such a rule was not intended, nor would be permitted, to interfere with parental control of children in the home;
but then a proviso to the proviso was added, the Court stating
that "interference with parental control of children in the home
would not be permitted unless the acts forbidden materially
affect the conduct and discipline of the school."25

II. REGULABLE AcrivrrrEs
Having examined the purported bases for jurisdiction of
secondary school authorities over students, and having set forth
the abstract legal principles which govern the enactment of rules
for conduct, as well as the enforcement of proper rules, we must
now approach the problem on a more concrete level. The question then becomes the practical one of what student activity may
be considered an "offense." This broad question necessarily requires an answer to certain other questions. First, how reasonable
has the Court found specific regulations to be; and second, how
has the Court of Appeals reacted to the enforcement of those
regulations?
In essence, this section will involve an examination of particular behavior on the part of students which resulted in disciplinary action. The thrust of this section is to demonstrate, on
a practical basis, how the Court of Appeals thinks its theoretical
rules should be applied.
It seems logical to conceive two categories of misconduct by
secondary school students: either the act is externally directed
and directly related to others in the school, or it is internally
directed toward the student himself, having no direct physical
effect upon others. In the former classification, positive acts or
words are directed externally, while in the latter, the matter is
one of personal appearance or attitude. It should not be mis24F. MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFsCERS § 730 (1890).
25 Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 876, 380, 161 S.W. 204, 206-07 (1913).
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apprehended that activities involving the latter category cannot
be felt to have an ultimate external effect. Even though manner
of attire does not physically affect other students, the sentiment
of the school authorties, if they attempt to proscribe articles of
dress, must be that such matters are in fact detrimental to the
academic atmosphere. Whether such sentiment will bear analysis
is another question.
A. Externally Directed Acts
Externally directed behavior may itself be separated into two
categories: (1) positive behavior, an act with the intent to
physically affect someone else; and (2) passive behavior, a refusal to do as ordered. Clearly a distinction between these two
forms of behavior must be drawn.
1. Positive Behavior
The secondary school has the right to enact a rule preventing
students from leaving school grounds during school hours. This
restrictive power has been extended to provisions against students patronizing business establishments off the school grounds,
or particular restaurants. In Board of Education v. Luster,26 such
a rule was violated when the father of two children persisted in
taking the children, or letting them go, to a restaurant which
had been declared off-limits. Applying the abstract notions set
forth above in Section I(B), the Court of Appeals held that the
regulation was not unreasonable or arbitrary, since it is common
knowledge that children allowed to select their own food will
often indulge in imbalanced diets. This regulation, the Court indicated, appeared to be for the common good of all children attending the school.
27
A similar prohibition was approved in Gott v. Berea College,
the Court expressing the view that the danger of epidemics from
unsanitary conditions in many public restaurants made the
regulation reasonable. Furthermore, Berea College maintained a
cafeteria for students' use and its minimal profit margin was a
persuasive factor. It should be noted that the Court's reference to
unsanitary conditions in public restaurants was a comment based
26 282 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. 1955).
27 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
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upon conditions in 1913, and would not necessarily hold true
today.
An essential part of maintaining discipline is a continued attitude of respect toward the governing authorities. Consequently,
in Board of Education v. Booth,28 disciplinary action was taken
against a pupil for insulting a teacher.2 9 That case, however, was
decided upon the basis that schools have the right to formulate
necessary rules for the administration of the school. Another
means of maintaining respect towards the teachers is found in
IRS § 161.190 which provides:
No person shall upbraid, insult or abuse any teacher of the
public schools in the presence of the school or in the presence
of a pupil of the school.
KRS § 161.990(3) provides that violators of KRS § 161.190 shall
be fined not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than one
hundred dollars ($100.00). Although this statute was probably
designed to operate against adults coming into the school, there
is no reason why it could not apply equally to students.
Another regulation which has been held reasonable and proper
is a rule establishing a curfew in a high school dormitory. In
Byrd v. Begley,30 the Court, confronted by such a rule, held that
a seven o'clock curfew, designed to require students to devote
their evenings to study instead of visiting, was reasonable beyond
doubt.
There exists a substantial quantity of precedent supporting the
suspension or expulsion of a pupil because he smoked upon school
grounds.3 1 Much of the case law concerning such a regulation is
based upon the concept that the school authorities have that
broad degree of discretion previously discussed and they may
exercise that discretion in order to protect the morality of the
pupils. Needless to say, this is a rather outdated approach, and
one that Kentucky need not employ. KRS § 438.050 makes it a
crime to smoke a cigarette on school grounds while children are
assembled on the premises for lawful purposes. Also KRS §
438.020(1) provides:
28 110 Ky. 807; 62 S.W. 872 (1901).
29 61 Op. ATry GEN. 293 (1961) refers to this action as being a grossly
insulting essay.
30
262 Ky. 422, 90 S.W.2d 870 (1936).
3
l See Annot., 33 A.L.R. 1180 (1924).
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Any person under the age of eighteen who smokes or has
about his person or premises any cigarette or cigarette papers
or any other form prepared to be filled with smoking tobacco for cigarette use, shall be fined not more than five
dollars.
These statutory provisions, coupled with the language of
KRS § 158.150, discussed infra,32 have the effect of permitting a
student in the Kentucky school system to be suspended or expelled for smoking on school premises.
Enforcement of a rule requiring expulsion of a student for
failure to maintain a certain grade level is not objectionable.
However, the situation will be critically examined by the courts
where there is evidence that the decision is an arbitrary one, the
expulsion not truly being based upon grades. 33
Illustrative of the limits courts will place upon the enactment of regulations governing pupils' extracurricular acti4 The Tenvities is Gentry v. Memphis Federationof Musicians.3
nessee legislature had enacted a statute which in effect made it
unlawful for any school band to play at functions outside the
school at which professional musicians might be employed. The
court held that this statute was designed for no purpose connected with school discipline, but solely for the purpose of
profiting another group of citizens, as to whom the students' rights
were not inferior.
Certainly, extracurricular activities may be regulated to some
extent, where they have a definite and direct connection with
the educational process. Thus, even without statutory authority,
high school students may generally be forbidden to create or join
secret societies, although such a regulation could not be enforced
during a school's vacation periodY In Kentucky Military Institute v. Bramblet,6 a rule forbidding hazing was held to be
reasonable.
32

Section II (c).
Barnard v. Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913).
34 177 Tenn. 566, 151 S.W.2d 1081 (1941).
5Wlson v. Abeline Independent School Dist., 190 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. 1945).
See also Passel v. Ft. Worth Independent School Dist., 429 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.
1968), sustaining the constitutionality of a Texas statute forbidding participation
by students in such organizations under pain of expulsion from school.
36 158 Ky. 205, 164 S.W. 808 (1914). It should be noted that the general
regulation involved in this case forbade, as well as hazing, gambling or possessing
gambling materials; use or possession of intoxicating drinks; profane or indecent
S3
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2. Passive Behavior
As stated before, into this category falls behavior which is
overt only in the sense that it is a refusal to actively participate in
some function. For example, in Cross v. Board of Trustees,3 7 a
pupil was suspended from school for declining a part in commencement exercises assigned him by the principal. Sustained by
the Court of Appeals, the suspension was rationalized upon the
basis that section 4867 of the Kentucky Statutes (now KRS §
158.150) provided that willful disobedience of a teacher was
38
good cause for suspension or expulsion.
A typical act of passivity on the part of a student is failure to
attend school at all. Since this is a matter largely controlled by
statute,3 9 there is little doubt that failure to attend school makes
the child susceptible to disciplinary procedures. On this matter,
the sole question is simply what type of punishment may be
administered.
A final facet is the requirement of KRS § 158.035 that each
child present a certificate showing his immunization. The statute
further provides that the governing body of the school, whether
public or private, shall enforce the provisions relating to that
certificate. 0 Without such statutory authorization a requirement
of vaccination is not so easily imposed. In Board of Trustees v.
McMurtry,41 the Court of Appeals held that where the state or
local health board has not expressly granted authority to him,
an individual health officer has no power to require pupils to be
vaccinated on pain of denial of the privilege of attending school.
The Court stated however that with proper legislative authorization, a state or local health board may issue such an order when
they believe that there is a reasonable apprehension of an epidemic in the school district and that vaccination of the school
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

language; owning or reading demoralizing papers, books or pictures; smoking

cigarettes or chewing tobacco; possessing concealed weapons; borrowing or
lending money; and contracting debts or selling clothes without permission of
the superintendent. But this case deals only with the hazing portion of the regulation and cannot be used as authority for the reasonableness of any other of
the mentioned prohibitions, even though certain of them would doubtless be
reasonable.
37 129 Ky. 85, 110 S.W. 846 (1908).
38 The school regulations, passed pursuant to an enabling clause, required
pupils39 to obey whatever was commanded by any teacher.
Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 159.010 (1934) et seq.
40 KRS § 214.086 (1968) creates certain health and religious exceptions.
41 169 Ky. 457, 184 S.W. 890 (1916).
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children is the only means by which it can be prevented. Of
course, even where there is no specific delegation of power, the
existence of an emergency justifies local school administrators in
making vaccination a condition for admission to public schools.
But, unless the legislature has expressly conferred the power to
do so, or unless such an emergency exists, the local body does not
have the authority to so require the vaccination.'
B. Internally Directed Acts
This section deals with the extent to which the school authorities may regulate behavior which is intended by the actor only
to express personal tastes or attitudes, with no primary intent
to affect other students.
1. Dress Codes
There are no Kentucky cases dealing directly with questions
arising in this area, but generally the student's appearance may
be regulated if it can be shown that there is a rational connection between the matter regulated and the educational processes of the school. The tenor of the Kentucky cases dealing
with the subject of regulation and discipline generally lend the
impression that this rule would be applied in the Commonwealth.
Certainly, where it can be shown that an item of attire is
causing actual damage to school property, the school authorities
are justified in proscribing the attire. Thus, evidence that the
school's hardwood floors were deteriorated at an inordinate rate
by metal heel plates on student's shoes has been held to justify
the prohibition of such heel plates.48 In reaching its decision, the
court rejected the argument that it was permitting detailed
regulation of student apparel; and because no hardship or indignity was being imposed upon the student, the court felt the
regulation to be reasonable.
Basically, the concern about appearance is based on the notion
that an extraordinary appearance is disruptive to school discipline. Such disruption might occur because of noisy heel
plates, 44 but it is a term more often applied to unusual hair2

Hill v. Bickers, 171 Ky. 703, 188 S.W. 766 (1916).
3Stromberg v. French, 60 N.D. 750, 236 N.W. 477 (1931).
44id.
4

4
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styles, immodest attire and excessive cosmetics. Some case law45
holds that school authorities may properly proscribe immodest
clothing and the use of cosmetics. While today it is unlikely
that moderately applying make-up would result in discipline,
rules prohibiting immodest attire or the excessive use of cosmetics are still viable in some locations.
It is entirely possible that health or religious requirements
could create exceptions to the degree of permissible regulation
of student appearance. A female student, recently ill, might well
be allowed to wear slacks to school, under orders of her mother,
if the weather should be inclement. 46 Then too, it is unlikely that
a court would permit school authorities to require a Catholic
student (attending a public school) to attend school on Ash
Wednesday.
Appearance may not only be prohibited, it may be prescribed.
Thus, the requirement that a pupil wear a specified uniform
during school hours was long ago said to be proper,4 7 but the
school cannot require the uniform to be worn at home if the
parent does not wish it.48
Certain attire may also be required for participation in a special
ceremony. Thus, participation in a graduation ceremony may
be conditioned upon the student's wearing a cap and gown. 49
However, a refusal of the school authorities to issue a student's
diploma and certificate because she refused to wear the cap
and gown was held arbitrary and unreasonable. 50
2. Symbolic Expression
There are occasions on which the regulation of a student's
personal appearance may come into conflict with freedoms
guaranteed him under the first amendment of the United States
Constitution. The status of high school student does not remove
a person from the protection of the Constitution, and the validity of a regulation which conflicts with the first amendment
freedom of speech is illustrated by two federal cases. Although
45

See, e.g., Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923).
See Annot., 14 A.L.R.8d 1201 (1967).
Connell v. Gray, 33 Okla. 591, 127 Pac. 417 (1912) (dictum).
48 Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
49
Valentine v. Independent School Dist., 191 Iowa 1100, 183 N.W. 434
(1921)id. See also the discussion of OAG 61-315, infra.
46
47
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no Kentucky cases have dealt with this question directly, it is
hardly arguable that the principles enunciated in these two
federal cases would not be applicable to Kentucky since the
issues in those two opinions arise from rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution.
In September of 1964, a number of students at a high school
in Philadelphia, Mississippi, began wearing "freedom buttons"
to school. The buttons were approximately one and one half
inches in diameter, and contained the words, "one man, one
vote" and the letters "S.N.C.C." The principal of the school
announced to the entire student body that these buttons were
not to be worn at the school. The basis for this regulation was
that the buttons had no bearing upon the educational process,
and would cause disturbance of the scholastic atmosphere. Disregarding this order, some of the students continued to wear
the buttons, and they were suspended from school. Burnside v.
Byare-' was the resulting civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (19) for a preliminary injunction, claiming breach of the
students' rights under the first and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution. The preliminary injunction was
denied, but on appeal it was held that the preliminary injunction should issue.
In Burnside the Court first stated that while the fourteenth
amendment clearly protects the first amendment rights of school
children against the imposition by school authorities of unreasonable regulations, first amendment freedom of speech may be
abridged by state officials if that abridgement is required to
protect a legitimate state interest. The need of effective discipline
for an orderly program of classroom learning being manifestly
a legitimate state interest, school officials are thus allowed a
wide latitude of discretion. Even so, such a regulatory rule must
be a reasonable exercise of this power. Thus, if regulations essential for the maintenance of order and discipline are reasonable,
an exchange of conversation between students may be properly
regulated even though such restriction would infringe upon a
basic freedom.
The Court in Burnside then inspected the record to determine
the degree of disruption caused in this school. The evidence
51

Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
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showed only a mild curiosity on the part of other children in
the school, and even the principal testified that the expulsion was
not the result of commotion, but because the school regulation
was violated. The Court took the position that there is an inherent distinction between wearing buttons in the manner which
had occurred and activities which would obviously distract
students, such as carrying banners, scattering leaflets and making
speeches. Therefore, the Court held that the wearing of these
buttons did not materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline and the operation of the
school. Thus, by the above described test, they were undue
infringements upon the students' right to free expression.
The distinctions drawn by the Court in Burnside are again
5 2 decided the same
illustrated in Blackwell v. Board of Education,
day as Burnside. In Blackwell, the same type of buttons were again
worn to a Mississippi high school. Certain students were initially
warned not to wear these buttons, which admonition would probably have been illegal by the Burnside rationale. Shortly after this
warning, several of the students returned to school with the
same buttons and began distributing them to students in the
corridor of the school building. This activity included pinning
buttons on students who did not ask for one, with a resultant
state of confusion and breakdown of orderly discipline in the
school. The Court held that the evidence clearly showed an
unusual degree of commotion and boisterous conduct, destroying
order, discipline, and decorum in the school. For these reasons,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the District Court
denying the preliminary injunction.
Although the rules in Burnside and Blackwell appeared as the
likely result, at least one United States District Court took a
slightly different position. In Tinker v. Independent Community
School District" an injunction was sought against school authorities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. During December, 1965,
school officials enacted a regulation prohibiting the wearing of
arm bands on school property. Aware of this regulation, the plaintiffs persisted in wearing black arm bands to their respective
schools in order to express their beliefs about the war in Vietnam.
52 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
53 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
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As stated by the District Court, the question was "whether the
action of officials of the defendant School District forbidding
the wearing of arm bands on school facilities deprived the
plaintiffs of constitutional rights secured by the freedom of speech
54
clause of the first amendment."
The District Court first enunciated the principles governing
the cases. Here, the court's language did not differ from that
creating the tests used in Burnside and Blackwell. Yet, in applying
the verbiage to an actual decision the conclusions of the two
courts differed. The District Court in Tinker held that while the
arm bands themselves might not be disruptive, it was the avowed
purpose of the plaintiffs to express their views on a controversial
subject in this manner, and the reactions and comments from
other students would be likely to disturb the atmosphere required
for school operations. An anticipation of disturbance, the Court
felt, was not unreasonable. Since the regulation did not prevent
discussion of the war within the school in an orderly, organized
manner, such a limited restriction was considered insignificant and
not improper. Acknowledging the persuasive effect of Burnside
and Blackwell, the District Court devised the rule that school
officials' actions should not be limited to situations involving only
the actual occurrence of material interference with school discipline. Rather, school officials were to be given a wide degree of
discretion, and if there should exist a reasonable basis upon which
school authorities might anticipate a breach of school discipline,
regulations reasonably calculated to prevent that disorder would
be upheld. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, this judg5
ment of the District Court was affirmed.2
The Supreme Court refused to ratify the rule established in
the lower courts' decisions in Tinker 5 6 The Supreme Court quickly
pointed out that Tinker does not involve regulation of clothing,
hairstyles or deportment, nor concern aggressive and disruptive
behavior. The Court conceived this case to involve silent and
passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by disorder or
disturbance. Discussing the record, Mr. Justice Fortas for the
majority emphasized that there was no disruption of school work
54 Id. at 972.
55
Tinker v. Independent Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.
1967).

56 Tinker v. Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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or interruption of the scholastic endeavors of the remaining
students. The decision of the school authorities had been based
upon a belief that demonstration through the wearing of the
arm bands simply should not be permitted, and not because of
actual fear of disruption. The majority opinion expressed the
undebatable proposition that a regulation adopted by school
officials forbidding discussion of the Vietnam war, or the expression by a student of opposition to that war, would violate the
students' constitutional rights, at least where it could not be
shown that such activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school. In this case, Mr.
Justice Fortas said that the wearing of armbands, being akin to
pure speech, could not be prohibited merely because school officials apprehended disturbance. Citing Burnside, the Court ruled
that such restrictions may not be sustained unless it can be
shown that the proscribed acts would materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school. Students in school as well as out of
school are "persons" under the United States Constitution, and
they are entitled to the exercise of fundamental rights, which
exercise cannot be confined to supervised and ordained discussion
taking place only in the classroom. So any attempted restriction
of the exercise of those rights to the classroom cannot be condoned. Careful note should be made, however, that the Court
also stated that conduct by the students, in class or out of it,
which for any reason materially disrupted class work or involved
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others would not
be immunized by the constitutional guaranty of free speech.
In a strong dissent, Mr. Justice Black took the position that the
activities involved were in fact disruptive of school decorum and
discipline. Justice Black's inspection of the record revealed to
him that the armbands did exactly what the elected school officials anticipated, i.e., distract pupils' minds from their classwork.
Justice Black characterized as a myth the theory that one has
a constitutional right to say what one pleases, where one pleases,
when one pleases, as the Court had often decided exactly the
opposite. In Justice Black's view a high school pupil has not a
complete freedom of speech within the school.
In the other dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan stated he was not
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certain that there was any disagreement between the majority
and himself on the proposition that school officials should be accorded wide authority in maintaining discipline in their institutions. Justice Harlan did, however, propose to translate that
principle into a workable constitutional rule by casting upon those
complaining the burden of showing that particular regulations
are motivated by other than legitimate school concerns.
Though there has been a great deal of concerned talk about
this particular decision of the Court, reasoned analysis will show
that the results are not truly shocking. First, it simply cannot be
reasonably argued that the District Court's rule in Tinker should
supplant the legal precepts found in Bumside, Blackwell and the
Supreme Court's rationale in Tinker. The latter three cases
clearly provide remedies for school authorities met with students
actually causing disruption of the classroom. Where disruption of
school discipline is not occurring, no sensible person could argue
that the students' right to speak, be it by pure or symbolic
speech, should be restricted. Argument comes only when an
interpretation of the fact situation must be made, and this is the
crux of the disagreement between the opinions of the majority
and Justice Black. A thornier problem is presented where the
situation is susceptible to an interpretation of nascent violence.
Here, to be sure, there are reasonable arguments for either position. Courts are daily willing to issue injunctions or affirm the
right of civil authorities to enforce a curfew where troubles do
not yet exist but are in fact imminent. True, it must be recognized
that the passive exercise of a first amendment right is of a high
plane; and a belief that others, enraged by that exercise, might
cause violence may not be adequate cause to restrict the privilege.
Yet, as Justice Black reminded the majority in biting phrases, the
Court has in fact allowed restrictions in such circumstances.
Making this point, Justice Black cited some recent cases, but he
neglected to cite a somewhat older case which is illuminative of
his theory of the issue.
Feinerv. New York5 7 involved the prosecution and conviction
of the petitioner for making a street corner speech tending to
cause racial agitation. The agitation never reached the point
of actual violence, but threats made by onlookers caused the
57340

U.S. 815 (1951).
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police to arrest Feiner. Affirming the conviction, the Supreme
Court cited earlier cases which held, in effect, that the state had
an obvious power to restrict freedom of speech when a clear and
present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic and
other immediate threats to public safety, peace and order appeared. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for the majority, felt
the record showed the petitioner was responsible for the creation
of such clear and present danger and the petitioner's rights were,
therefore, justifiably restricted.
One dissenter saw Feiner in the gravest light, finding it to be
"a dark day for civil liberties in our Nation."58 In his mind, the
decision rested upon a belief that the policeman, under the circumstances detailed, could reasonably conclude whether serious
commotion or riot was imminent. Therefore, the policeman
could restrict the petitioner's right of freedom of speech in order
to prevent the supposed riot. The dissenter viewed the record as
making "far-fetched" any suggestion that there was imminent
threat of riot or uncontrollable disorder. That dissenter was Mr.
Justice Black.
It would appear that both the majority has changed in composition and Justice Black has changed his position. But the
principle of stare decisis demands that the new majority in Tinker
should have made some greater effort at harmonizing the various
decisions. Moreover, little legal training is required to understand
that Black's two dissenting opinions are on their faces contradictory. In Feiner, he would have reversed a conviction because he believed that a few mumbles did not allow New York
to restrict freedom of speech. In Tinker, he was willing to give
local school authorities the power to determine whether there
was danger of turmoil, and he would have found that such danger
existed in Tinker because a few adverse comments had been made.
Consequently, it would seem that Justice Black's comments to the
effect that a high school student's constitutional rights while in
school are not absolute is indicative of a change in his philosophy
on these matters.
The cited cases demonstrate the difficulty included in the
practical, vis-a-vis the theoretical, discussion of any legal subject. In law school we are taught principles of law. In practice
58 Id. at 828.
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there is usually little argument about the applicable rules of law

but great conflict between statements of fact. Mr. Justice Harlan
was close to home when he stated that he did not think he
truly disagreed with the fundamental principles outlined by the
majority. But beyond agreement as to fundamental principles always comes a question of fact. It is not a question of lack of certainty in the law, for the Supreme Court itself was unable to
state with greater clarity the legal principles enunciated in Burnside and Blackwell. Yet the Court might divide upon a conclusion to be drawn from an application of those principles to the
facts of a given case.

8. Hairstyles
The principles involved in Burnside, Blackwell and Tinker are
being extended to a contemporary teapot tempest, bizarre hair
styles. It has been held that unusual hair styles may be rationally
forbidden where they tend to distract other pupils. Proof of the
student's good character in other respects, or his use of the hair
style in his role as a professional musician have been considered
immaterial."O Some federal district courts have held that compelling a student to cut his hair does not infringe upon his first
amendment right of freedom of expression, disparage any rights

provided him by the ninth amendment, or constitute a cruel and
unusual punishment within the scope of the eighth amendment.
Thus, these courts have held that a regulation enacted by a state

school board barring students with extreme hair cuts from attendance at school was not unreasonable nor arbitrary where it

was shown that disturbances and disruption of classroom atmosphere resulted when such hair cuts were worn in the school.6 0
59 Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
60 Crews v. Clones, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969); Davis v. Firment,
269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967); Ferrell v. Independent School District, 261
F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966). Further comment about Ferrell, is necessary.
In that case the District Court cited an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
Byrd v. Sexton, 277 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1960), as support for a supposed two
part test under which it was to be determined whether plaintiff students would
have a cause of action against school authorities under the civil rights statutes
because of the enactment of some regulation which affected the students. The
Texas District Court misconstrued the language of Byrd, in stating that the first
question in a two part test used in Byrd was the determination of whether actions
of the school authorities were unlawful under state law. However, this is not
an accurate reading of Byrd. In the passage in question, the Byrd Court simply
pointed out that the plaintiff claimed no invalidity of state law or of state constitutional provisions, but at most complained of acts said to be improper under
(Continued on next page)
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It must be emphasized that the federal courts are moving
away from a determination of which particular constitutional
rights of the student might be infringed through action taken
against him because of his particular hair style. Instead, such
theoretical analyses are truncated by the simple statement that
the freedom of a person to present himself physically to the
world as he sees fit is a highly protected freedom, and any effort
on the part of the state to impair this freedom imposes upon the
2
61
state a "substantial burden of justification." In Breen v. Kahl(
the District Court found that the defendant authorities had not
carried their substantial burden of justification. With regard to
distraction of other pupils, the record contained expressions of
opinion by several school administrators that such distraction does
result from an abnormal appearance of one student, but no direct
testimony appeared in the record that such distraction had in
fact occurred. Contentions on the part of school authorties that
non-conforming students did not perform as well as those presenting an ordinary appearance likewise failed for lack of hard
facts. The Court agreed that the degree of proof necessary for the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

the Missouri Constitution. Ferrell implies that a federal district court, in order
to find for plaintiffs in such a case, must be shown that the school authorities were
acting contrary to state law, but this is precisely opposite to what the Circuit
Court was saying. The thrust of the Circuit Court opinion was that invalidity of
the state law or the state constitution vis-a-vis the United States Constitution
must be shown. Reflection upon the purpose of the Civil fights statutes makes
it apparent that the District Court is incorrect, and even causes the belief that
the Court did not intend to express such a position. Such statutes were designed
to protect United States citizens' rights in the face of state statutes proper under
the State Constitution, and were not intended to operate only where State law was
also broken.
61 Breen v. Kabl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 706 (W.D. Wisc. 1969). The reasoning of
this case, however, has recently been rejected by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Jackson v. Dorrier, No. 19351, decided April 6, 1970, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals sustained a Tennessee District Courts decision denying injunction relief requested by students. The Court of Appeals rejected arguments
that the students had been deprived of freedoms guaranteed them by the first,
third, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution. It found that substantial evidence supported the findings of the
district judge that regulation of hair length has a real and reasonable connection with the successu operation of the educational system and with the maintenance of school discipline. The Court chose to follow Ferrell v. Independent
School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex 1966). It should be noted that the
District Court had heard evidence concerning disturbances of the classroom
atmosphere and decorum resulting from the long hair. To this extent, therefore,
the decision is not surprising. The theory that there is a right to freedom of appearance was clearly rejected in Breen v. Kahl, so the field is fertile for a decision
of the United States Supreme Court finally deciding the matter of questions of
appearance alone, not involving claims of first amendment freedoms.
62 296 F.Supp 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
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school authorties to meet their burden is often a delicate and uncertain matter, but it emphasized that the defendants had fallen
far short of showing that the distraction caused by male high
school students whose hair lengths exceeded the board standard
was so aggravated, frequent and persistent that this invasion of
their individual freedom by the state was warranted. In fact, the
Court noted the state superintendent did not find that the length
of the plaintiff's hair was the disruptive influence or factor, but
only that a refusal to obey the board's rule was disruptive. The
Court considered there to be a significant distinction between
these two types of disruption, expressing the position that disruption of the latter category obviously affords no support for
constitutionality of the regulation itself.
It is readily apparent that the three political cases earlier discussed contain the very principles involved in regulation of a student's hair style. The mere belief on the part of school administrators that disruption will occur from the wearing of an unusual
hair style will not be suffcient to warrant interference with the
student's freedom of appearance. Rather, school officials must be
able to show actual disruption of school decorum and discipline.
The only apparent essential difference between political expression and personal appearance is that the courts, with respect to
the latter category, do not intend to work themselves into a
theoretical corner by assigning these rights of personal attire
and grooming to a specific provision of the United States Constitution.
Ultimately some court may declare all dress codes unenforceable, but no one wins or loses in such event. If appearance does
not truly harm school decorum, the rules in the cited cases prevent regulation, regardless of what the dress code provides. Those
rules at the same time give the school authorities defined powers
which operate even in the absence of a dress code.
4. Marriage of Students
It is not unusual for persons of high school age to marry. But
the marriage of persons still in high school is felt by most school
authorties to be destructive of scholastic decorum and not to be
sanctioned. The leading case in Kentucky upon this issue is Board
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of Education v. Bentley.63 The rule enunciated in the case is a
quotation with approval of 47 Am. Jur. Schools § 155:
However, a pupil may not be excluded from school because
married, where no immorality or misconduct of the pupil
is shown, nor that the welfare and discipline of the pupils
of the school is [sic] injuriously affected by the presence of
the married pupil.
Accordingly the Court in Bentley found that the regulation involved was invalid.
In Bentley the regulation contained language to the effect
that any student who married must automatically withdraw from
school, the student not being permitted to re-enter for one full
year, and then only as a special student with permission of the
principal. Bentley was apprised of this regulation prior to her
marriage and, as was the practice of the board, she was permitted
to complete the then current six weeks term before being required
to withdraw.
The Court agreed that the board was entitled to exercise its
sound discretion in these matters and that a reasonable and appropriate regulation could well be adopted. Yet, this regulation
was held arbitrary and unreasonable. Even though the board
claimed that such marriages cause a great deal of excitment and
discussion, thereby disrupting school work, it was admitted that
the board, as a matter of practice, still permitted as much as six
weeks of continued attendance at the school before the pupil was
required to leave. Assuming that the board was correct in its
statement of purpose, this possibility of six weeks attendance at
school while married had the effect of destroying the purpose
of the regulation. But the regulation's fatal vice was its determination that every married student, regardless of circumstances, was
to lose at least a year of schooling. Subsequently, he could be
re-admitted if the principal allowed it. Yet, the principal was
given no standards by which to reach his decision, and the pupils
had no gauge by which to estimate whether the principal's consent would be forthcoming. Additionally, the refusal of the
school board to grant an exception in this case, solely on the
63 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1964).
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grounds that it had never granted an exception before, demonstrated to the Court the unreasonable and arbitrary effect of the
regulation, i.e. imposing an identical result in every case without
regard to circumstances.
Certain criteria by which to judge an anti-marriage regulation immediately become apparent from language contained in
Bentley. First, the board must be given discretion to weigh the
circumstances and then reach a decision. To this end, the
regulation may not contain a provision automatically imposing the
penalty. Next, the vesting of power to readmit a pupil must be
accompanied by guidelines sufficient to allow both the authority
and the student means by which to decide whether consent to
readmission would be granted.

C. Statutory Amplification of Kentucky Case Law
Several statutes amplify the case law of Kentucky. KRS §
160.290(2) provides:
Each [school] board shall make and adopt... rules, regulaations, and bylaws . . .for the government, regulation, and

management of the public schools and school property of the
district .. . and for ... the conduct of pupils. The rules,
regulations, and bylaws . . . shall be consistent with the

general school laws of the state and shall be binding on the
board of education and parties dealing with it....
KRS § 158.150 provides:
All pupils admitted to the common schools shall comply with
the lawful regulations for the government of the schools.
Willful disobedience or defiance of the authority of the teachers, habitual profanity or vulgarity, or other gross violation
of propriety or law constitutes cause for suspension or expulsion from school...64
To a great extent, enforcement of rules and regulations passed
by the board falls to the school superintendent, who has general
supervision of the conduct of the schools and the discipline of
pupils. 65 As a practical matter, the teacher also plays a significant
64KRS § 158.030 (1962) defines a "common school" as "an elementary or
secondary
school of the ;tate supported in whole or in part by public taxation."
6

5KRS § 160.370 (1962).

19701

WrrH TEmPERATE ROD

role in the maintenance of school discinline. Each teacher is to
enforce the course of study and regulations prescribed for the
schools.6 More precisely, KRS § 161.180 provides:
Each teacher in the public schools shall hold pupils to a
strict account for their conduct in the school, on the way to
and from school, on the playgrounds, and during intermission or recess.
Armed with these statutes, the jurisdiction of the board, the
superintendent, and the teacher would seem almost plenary, and
an examination of these statutes gives the initial impression that
it might well prove useless to contend a rule was unreasonable.
Under KRS § 161.180, the teacher is to hold pupils to a strict
account for their conduct even while going to and from school,
with case law extending the possibility of control even into the
home. Also, under KRS § 158.150, specified discipline may be
imposed for "other gross violation of propriety or law." The
phrase "gross violation of law" has been used to support an Attorney General's opinion that it was proper to suspend unmarried students engaging in sexual relations where the girl subsequently became pregnant during the school year.67
Although apparently nowhere officially interpreted, the other
portion of KRS § 158.150, "gross violation of propriety," would
seem even wider in scope and possibility of interpretation. At
least a violation of law is, by definition, an act contrary to specific
statutes or ordinances, while a violation of propriety becomes al
too subjective.
Also, under KRS § 158.150, wilful disobedience or defiance of
the authority of teachers will result in the specified discipline. In
fact, in Byrd v. Begley,6 the curfew case, an earlier version of this
statute was held to authorize suspension of the student. The student had been found in a room other than his after the 7:00 p.m.
curfew and was ordered to his room. He being slow in obeying
the order and announcing the intention to go to sleeping quarters
other than his own room, suspension by the superintendent ensued.
66 KRS § 161.170 (1946).
671957 Op. ATT'Y GNa. 40021. Whether any such acts took place on school
property was not stated.
68262 Ky. 422, 90 S.W.2d 370 (1936). See note 19 supra.
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This "defiance of teachers" statute plainly contains the greatest
possibilities for insidious official behavior contrary to the rights
of the secondary school student. While "gross violation of propriety" is a vague enough term allowing for myriad sins, as a
matter of practice it would not be a vexatious phrase. Activities
considered to fall within that prohibition would likely be punishable under different rules and other theories. Yet, it is practicality
itself which causes the other important portion of KRS § 158.150
to be disturbing. While wilful disobedience or defiance of the
authority of teachers appears at first blush to be something the
school canot permit, the phraseology gives the school authorities
power to levy the prescribed penalties for any wilful disobedience or any defiance. The statute draws no distinction between
disobeying or defying an improper rule or improper exercise of
authority. By making that observation, there is no intention of
raising questions as to civil disobedience being a right of the
high school student. The point is not that the student has a right
to attempt a distinction between proper and improper exercise
of authority, but that the statute in fact draws no distinction between proper or improper authority. This is the dangerous aspect
of KRS § 158.150.
III. METHODS OF DiscLrNmI

A simple statement of possible modes of discipline produces a
rather short list. A pupil could be detained after school (with
commonly applied additives such as washing blackboards), a
money penalty might be imposed, a search of his person with subsequent seizure of offending articles is conceiveable, and withholding academic records might be useful. Nearly all these disciplinary tactics have been attempted in the past, but they are
relatively minor methods. The disciplinary techniques receiving
the most emphasis, in both application and argument, are corporal
punishment and suspension and expulsion.
A. CorporalPunishment
It is the nearly universal rule that a teacher has a privilege of
sorts against liability for reasonable corporal punishment ad-
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ministered as a disciplinary measure.6 9 Some courts long ago
took the position that a parent, lawfully imbued with the power
of reasonable correction, may delegate part of his parental
authority to the teacher which the teacher may then exercise in
a moderate manner.7 0 However, if the punishment inflicted was
in fact unreasonable or excessive, it is no defense that the teacher
was acting within the scope of his authority to maintain academic
control. Unlike the board, the individual teacher is not clothed
with governmental immunity.7 1 Thus, the question of whether the
teacher was acting within or without his authority has been
characterized as irrelevant to whether he is liable for a tort
arising from corporal punishment. 72
A few courts have held that there is a presumption of reasonableness of the corporal punishment administered 7 3 and others
have stated that the teacher is entitled to the benefit of any
doubt that may exist.7 4 These statements apparently mean only
that the burden is on the student, as on any plaintiff, to prove
that the discipline used was improper.
Among the factors the courts have thought important in
gauging reasonableness are age, size, sex, physical condition, and
the conduct of the pupil which caused the teacher to take disciplinary steps.7 5 Some courts have admitted evidence tending to
show that the pupil had misbehaved in the past,76 although other
courts have held that an instruction permitting the jury to consider the disposition of the pupil was erroneous. The essential
criterion being that the punishment be reasonable and moderate,
the fact that the punishment does not have the salutary effect
sought is not important, and a teacher may not continue to beat
78
a student simply because he appears to be unsubdued.
Some states have accompanied the granting to the teacher of
69 This rule is supported by implication in Hardy v. James, 5 Ky. Ops. 36
(1872)
'170See, e.g., Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266 (1847).
71 See discussion at section IV. B. infra.
72
Carr v. Wright, 423 S.W.2d 521 (Ky. 1968); Kentucky Military Institute
v. Bramblett, 158 Ky. 205, 164 S.W. 808 (1914).
73 See, e.g., Drake v. Thomas, 310 Il11. App. 57, 83 N.E.2d 889 (1941).
74
75 See, e.g., Caiway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377 (1944).
Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49, 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954).
7
0 Adreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 141 A.2d 639
(1958); Drake v.
Thomas, 310 IM. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941).
77
Haycraft v. Grigsby, 88 Mo. App. 354 (1901).
78
Whitley v. State, 33 Tex. Grim. 17, 25 S.W. 1072 (1894).
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the power of discipline over pupils, with certain statutory relief
from liability for punishment.
In Pennsylvania, 24 Pennsylvania Statutes § 13-1317 provides:
Every teacher, vice principal, and principal in the public
schools shall have the right to exercise the same authority
as to conduct and behavior over the pupils attending his
school, during the time they are in attendance, including the
time required in going to and from their homes, as the parents, guardians, or persons in parental relation to such pupils
may exercise over them.
But a child has rights against a barbarous parent, and a teacher
acting malo animo may be found by the jury to be without the
79
protection of the statute.
The Montana statute differs slightly from most, in that it involves the actual granting of authority to levy corporal punishment. 4 Revised Code of Montana § 75-2407 provides:
Whenever it shall be deemed necessary to inflict corporal
punishment on any student in the public schools, such punishment shall be inflicted without undue anger and only in the
presence of teacher and principal, if there be one, and then
only after notice to the parents or guardian; except that in
cases of open and flagrant defiance of the teacher or the
authority of the school, corporal punishment may be inflicted by the teacher or principal without such notice.
It is immediately apparent after reading this statute that there yet
remains a number of fact questions; for example, was the punishment inflicted with "undue anger," and was proper notice given
to the parent or guardian?
Texas has relieved the teacher of certain criminal liability by
enacting 2A Texas Penal Code, Art. 1142:
Violence used to the person does not amount to an assault
or battery in the following cases:
1. In the exercise of the right of moderate restraint or correction given by law to... the master over his apprentice, the
teacher over the scholar.
This statute, of course, only relieves the teacher of criminal
liability for assault and battery, and does not relate to other
crimes or to civil liability.
79

Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A.2d 468 (1942).
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Where the argument has been made that a statute abrogated
the teacher's privilege of reasonable corporal punishment as a
means of discipline, the courts have required an explicit declaration of that purpose in the language of the statute. 80 In this
regard it should be noted that KRS § 167.170 grants to the State
Board of Education alone the power of expulsion of a pupil from
the Kentucky School for the Blind. It further provides:
No officer or employee of the school shall be permitted to inflict corporal punishment upon any of the pupils.
Punishment must be authorized to be reasonable. Reasonableness in degree of an unauthorized punishment can operate
to mitigate damages. Thus, a teacher in a public school was held
unable to thrash a pupil for failure to pay for the careless destruction of school property, the requirement of payment being
viewed as unreasonable. 8 ' Likewise, where a fourteen year old
pupil's father had forbidden her to carry water from a well to
the school, the teacher was powerless to order her to do so, and
any corporal punishment for a refusal to carry the water was
2
8

improper.

Finally, the punishment must be administered because of a
definite offense which the pupil has committed, and the pupil
should be told why he is being punished. The purposes of punishment are reformation of the pupil, enforcement and maintenance
of school discipline and setting an example for other students;
but unless the punishment is related to a specific wrong and
this relation is made known, these ends cannot be met and the
punishment cannot be proper.83
B. Suspension and Expulsion
The second important category of discipline is suspension or
expulsion, a technique long enjoyed by school authorities in Kentucky. KRS § 158.150 provides:
27 Me. 266 (1847).
State v. Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11, 18 N.E. 266 (1888).
82 State v. Davis, 158 Iowa 501, 139 N.W. 1073 (1913). It is not altogether
certain however, that the court founded its decision upon the refusal of the child to
carry the water, as the defendant himself went to great length to show punishment 8for insolence in refusal, not mere refusal.
3 State v. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145 (1878).
80 See, e.g., Stevens v. Fassett,
81
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All pupils admitted to the common schools shall comply with
the lawful regulations for the government of the schools. Wilful disobedience or definance of the authority of the teachers,
habitual profanity or vulgarity, or other gross violation of
propriety or law constitutes cause for suspension or expulsion
from school. The superintendent, principal or head teacher
of any school may suspend a pupil for such misconduct, but
shall report such action in writing immediately to the super-

intendent. The Board of Education of any school district
may expel any pupil for misconduct as defined in this section,
but such action shall not be taken until the parent, guardian,
or other person having legal custody or control of the pupil
has had an opportunity to have a hearing before the Board.
The decision of the Board shall be final.
This statutory authorization has long existed in Kentucky, at
least since 1893, when Ky. Stat § 4367, the predecessor to KIRS §
158.150, was enacted. Clearly then, suspension of a pupil may be
authorized by a superintendent, principal or head teacher of
schools in Kentucky. Upon a hearing being had as to the facts of
the situation, the Board of Education of the school district may
expel the pupil for the prescribed reasons.
It is, of course, not unusual that the remedy of suspension is
granted by statute. What is unusual is that it may be the exclusive remedy of Kentucky school authorties. In OAG 61-315 the
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky rendered an
opinion in response to the following question: May the school records of a pupil be withheld at the end of the school year if that
pupil has damaged school text books and other school property
and not made restitution for same? First detailing the provision
of KRS § 158.150 and briefly reviewing various cases mentioning
the right of suspension and expulsion, the Attorney General concluded that the student could not be denied his school records;
because the statute defines the method of enforcing disciplinary
rules and regulations without mentioning withholding records.
However, the Attorney General must have viewed this construction as not ruling out all other modes of disciplinary sanction
since in OAG 61-293 (rendered on the same date as OAG 61-315)
the opinion was given that a pupil who has failed to prepare his
lessons may be detained after school hours for a brief period of
time. This opinion was based upon KIRS § 161.180, which provides that teachers shall hold pupils to a strict account for their
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conduct in school. Later, in OAG. 64-329, the Attorney General
rendered an opinion that a school teacher may search a pupil's
pockets or purse and confiscate such articles as cigarette lighters,
pocket knives, or key chains with cigarette lighters attached if
the teacher acts with reasonable judgement and for good cause,
without malice and for the welfare of the child as well as of the
school. This opinion was based upon a Tennessee case, and upon
a general rule followed by the Court of Appeals that teachers and
officials of public schools stand in loco parentis to the pupil.
Furthermore prior to OAG 61-315, the Attorney General had assumed power in teachers to levy punishment other than suspension when he opined in OAG 60-558 that a teacher is empowered to inflict corporal punishment on disorderly and insubordinate students.
It should be noted that the Court of Appeals has never had
before it a case involving the question whether, in light of KRS
§ 158.150, corporal punishment is permissible. Only two Kentucky
cases even refer to corporal punishment. In Hardy v. James,84
the question was not whether the teacher might inflict corporal
punishment upon a refractory pupil, but whether the teacher had
a right to strike the pupil when he himself was struck during the
course of a game in which he was participating as an equal. The
only other case which even refers to the question of inflicting
corporal punishment is Cross v. Board of Trustees,85 wherein the
Court decided that suspension from school was the proper recourse, as infliction of corporal punishment would have been unwise for the particular act of disobedience there involved, since
the pupil was eighteen years of age and too large to be subject to
a whipping.
However, the question whether the legislature, by authorizing suspension and expulsion determined that the method
of discipline should govern all cases exclusively and thereby
eliminated other forms of disciplinary action was the exact
question posed in Stevens P. Fassett,8 and the Maine Court held
that statutory language similar to KRS § 158.150 was not sufficient
to support a decision that moderate corporal punishment was
prohibited. The applicable statute provided that a school superKy. Ops. 36 (1872).
853 K.L.R. 472, 129 Ky. 85, 110 S.W. 346 (1908).
845

8627 Me. 266 (1847).
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intending committee should expel from school any obstinately disobedient student. The contention that this forbade corporal
punishment was rejected for several reasons. The rule of moderate
physical punishment was a well established one. Secondly, such
intent was not sufficiently explicit in the language of the statute.
Finally the statute simply specified a type of action which might
be taken against the described pupils, and did not indicate that
other action, fundamentally less severe, might not be taken against
pupils who had disobeyed their teachers repeatedly.
The Maine Court in Stevense7 was clearly incorrect in its reasoning. With regard to its first basis for decision, it is true that the
privilege of moderate corporal punishment is a well established
one but the mere fact that it is established does not prevent the
legislature from enacting a statute which modifies or eliminates
it. As to the second reason, a statute need not specify the remedies
which are not to exist subsequent to its enactment for it to constitute an exclusive remedy. With respect to the third, the Court
presumed that the "other action" would be fundamentally less
severe than suspension or expulsion. This rationale neglects the
consideration that the student, when threatened with suspension
or expulsion, would be entitled to a hearing and given an opportunity to state his case, and to subject the teacher's position to
objective examination. It can hardly be said that this is a
fundamentally more severe action than arbitrary action such as
corporal punishment.
This last comment relates directly to the question raised
earlier in this article concerning the propriety of that portion of
KRS § 158.150 (1962) making wilful disobedience or defiance
of the authority of teachers cause for suspension or expulsion from
school, regardless of whether the teacher was in fact acting
properly. If KRS § 158.150 (1962) is construed to constitute a
complete description of the forms of discipline available to the
school authorities, then the questions raised earlier concerning
obedience of even improper orders are answered. If this section
is determined to govern exclusively, there would be no possibility
of improper corporal punishment. The question of discipline
would be one determined at a hearing which in turn would reveal
87 d.
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first, whether the order was proper, and second, whether the
order was disobeyed.
IV.

PENALTIES FOR IMPROPER PUNISHMENT

The purpose of this section is to isolate the rules which
determine the penalty or the extent of liability to be suffered by
the teacher or other individual imposing improper punishment.
One approach to this area could conceivably involve an attempt
to relate particular types of punishment to particular types of
misconduct on the part of the student. In that way a quite
mechanical approach could be used in determining liability.
Punishment "A" would necessarily follow misconduct category
"1," and any deviation from that a priori determination would
mean one of two things: the teacher was not applying sufficient
punishment, or the teacher would be liable, civilly or criminally,
for an excess of punishment.
Unfortunately there is little case law which supports such a
computer-like administration of student-teacher relations. Indeed,
there has been little or no discussion of this question in the cases.
The only occasion on which the Kentucky Court of Appeals has
had an opportunity to mention the matter was in Cross v. Board
of Trustees.88 That case regretfully offers no assistance since the
basis for determination that corporal punishment would not have
been suitable in the circumstances was not that the misbehavior
did not call for corporal punishment, but that the student was of
such age and size as to make its application inappropriate.
While it is true that some correlation of type of punishment
to class of misbehavior could be created, e.g. offending items
might be confiscated, nearly all offenses can be treated with suspension/expulsion, corporal punishment, or detention. The
general approach has been to leave to the discretion of the
authorities the question of what sanction is proper in the circumstances, trusting them not to use methods which common
sense would call too severe for the offense. 89 That the discretion
of the school authorities is the dominant element emphasizes the
88 33 K.L.R. 472, 129 Ky. 35, 110 S.W. 346 (1908). For a discussion of this
case, see the text accompanying note 86 supra.
89 See cases cited in Section L
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importance of providing punishment which is administered only
after a hearing is granted the student. In this way, the facts upon
which the school authority bases its decision will be known, and
a reviewing court will be given as correct a record as possible by
which to judge the authority's action.
A. Wrongful Suspension Or Expulsion
Concerning the liability of the school authorities for the
wrongful suspension or expulsion of a student, there is little that
need be added to the previous discussion." While at least one
jurisdiction has taken the view that such action by a school board
is judicial in nature and the members thus being immune from
liability even though they acted with malice,9 1 this is not the
general rule. In such situations, the cases cited in Part I of this
article clearly show that liability on the part of the school
authorities will lie only where the suspension or expulsion was
arbitrary, unreasonable, with malice, or with "other improper
motive." The only distinction to be drawn is between a cause of
action on the student's part and a cause of action on the part of
the parents. Manifestly, the student is deprived of a valuable
right and privilege, a loss for which he may recover damages.9 2
On the other hand, a parent has no right to damages, absent loss
or expense; and generally his only remedy is an action for man93
damus to compel the authorities to readmit his child to school,
94
although there is some authority to the contrary.
B. Improper Corporal Punishment
Personal liability of an individual for excessive corporal
punishment levied against a pupil in an effort at discipline takes
one of two forms: civil or criminal. But the school board in Kentucky is immune from liability for the tort of an individual
supervisor, teacher or board member. Naturally, anyone actively
participating in the tortious conduct will be personally liable for
his own involvement, and it is quite unlikely that liability will be
90

See Parts I and I, B supra.
91 Swee
v. Young, 82 N.H. 159, 131 A. 155 (1925).
92 See Williams v. Smith, 192 Ala. 428, 68 So. 323 (1915).
93 See, e.g., Douglas v. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254, 116 S.W. 211, 211 L.R.A.

(N.S.)94 205 (1909).
See, e.g., Roe v. Deming, 21 Ohio St. 666 (1871).
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imputed beyond the active participants. But a board of education
is immune from liability for physical harm inflicted upon a student by an individual teacher, or superintendent because the
school board constitutes an integral part of the state, and it is
entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity 5
Even though the board as an entity may be immune, the individual board members may yet be liable, even though they may
not be personally involved in the incident. If it can be proven
that the individual board members negligently employed the
person causing the harm, then they will be individually liable.
But in order to prove such negligence it must be shown that the
individual members knew, when they hired him, of the employee's propensity for the particular willful conduct causing the
harm.9"
Unlike Kentucky, some jurisdictions have statutes imposing
liability upon the school board for any judgment arising out of
the negligence of the school district, its officers or employees 7 A
Connecticut statute requires boards of education to save any
teacher, employee or staff member from financial loss and expense arising out of any law suit for personal injury from punishment levied 8 This protection is conditioned upon a showing
that the teacher or employee was acting in the discharge of his
duties within the scope of his employment or under the direction
of the board. 9 The Connecticut courts have interpreted this
statute not to impose liability directly upon the board of education, but to provide indemnification to 1the teacher from loss,
rather than indemnification from liability. 00
1. Civil Liability
Civil liability may result from a breach of the simple rules of
negligence; that is, did the teacher fail to act as a reasonably
prudent person would act in the same or similar circumstances. 1 '
05 Carr v. Wright, 423 S.W.2d 521 (Ky. 1968); Cullinan v. Jefferson Co.,

418 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1967); Wood v. Board of Educ., 412 S.W.2d 877 (Ky.
1967).

96Moores v. Fayette Co., 418 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1967) (dictum); Wood v.
Board of Educ., 412 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1967) (dictum).
97 Cf. CA.W. GoV. CODE § 815, 812.25 (West 1963), formerly CAIF.
EDUC. CODE, § 903 (West 1959).

98 CONN. GN. STAT. § 10.235 (1958).
99Id.
00

1 Plasse v. Board of Educ., 28 Conn. Supp. 198, 256 A.2d 519 (1969);
v. Coombs, 19 Conn. Supp. 391, 115 A.2d 468 (1955).
Swainbank
01

1 Drum v. Miller, 135 N.C. 204, 47 S.E. 421 (1904).
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It has been held that if a teacher, from the knowledge she had of
a pupil and from his appearance, could justifiably suppose the
child to be like other children of his age, and inflicted only a
proper punishment, the teacher would not be liable for damages,
even though some hidden defect in the pupil's constitution causes
unusual injury to follow the punishment.0 2 Such a rule places the
duty upon parents having children whose health was impaired to
inform the teacher of that fact.0 3 This, of course, is manifestly
contrary to the general principle that a tortfeasor takes the plaintiff as he finds him, no immunity from liability occurring by
reason of some peculiar defect in the plaintiff.
Apart from liability based upon negligence, the teacher may
be held responsible in damages by reason of his bad motive. In
truth, an investigation into the teacher's motives is simply another
means of determining the reasonableness of the punishment.
However, punishment with improper motive is distinguishable
from negligently imposed punishment by the factor of intent. A
teacher imposing corporal punishment with malice will be held
liable for damages regardless of the care exercised in the imposition. 04
Finally, there exists the possibility of actions against the
teacher or other school authorities for civil assault and battery,
false imprisonment, personal injury and wrongful death.
The normal rules of damages involved in civil liability are
applied. 10 5 Assessing compensatory damages involves diminution
or destruction of the power to earn money, medical and other
attendant expenses, physical and mental pain and suffering, and,
for the parent, loss of services of the child. Punitive damages are
recoverable when the acts complained of were especially wanton,
reckless, malicious or offensive in nature. 106 Also relevant here is
the generally applicable KRS § 411.010 (1962), which provides
that a defendant in a civil action for damages inflicted by an assault or battery may plead in defense or mitigation of claim for
102 Quinn v. Nolan, 7 Ohio 585, 4 W.L. Bull. 81 (1879).
103 Id.
104 Drum v. Miller, 185 N.C. 204, 47 S.E. 421 (1904). It has been held that
cases requiring malice as a precondition to recovery must be considered as creating
rules of criminal law rather than civil liability. E.g., Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala.
449, 71 So. 2d 49, 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954).
105 Harrod v. Fraley, 289 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1956).
1l6 Id.
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punitive damages any provocation of such a nature to cause a
person of ordinary prudence and judgment to take the action
which was taken by the defendant.
2. Criminal Liability
It is, of course, axiomatic that criminal liability depends only
upon whether the constituent elements of crime have been
satisfied. If such precedent elements are met by infliction of
disciplinary action, unlike the civil rule, there can be no privilege
even for a parent,.07 much less for a teacher.
Some case law holds, however, that criminal liability will not
follow a mere excess in punishment, but will result only where
death or permanent injury to the child results, or where malice
on the part of the teacher is shown. 0 8 The requisite malice may
be either proven directly or inferred from the circumstances.
Malice may be express, such as where there is specific evidence
introduced tending to show that the teacher acted out of spite,
hatred, ill will, passion, anger or the motive of revenge with the
specific intent to inflict the harm which resulted. 10 9 However, the
malice sufficient to impose criminal lability not always being express malice, or easily proven, the doctrine of legal malice has
been constructed. This is the appellation for permitting inference
of the malice from the circumstances in order to support a
criminal conviction. It is a fundamental rule of criminal law that
legal malice may be inferred from the type of instrument used to
inflict the injury or from the extent and nature of the use of that
instrument. 110 Furthermore, even though it is said that mere excess
of punishment will not support a criminal conviction, a purpose
other than correction may be inferred therefrom and constitute
would
legal malice."1 Similarly, particularly cruel punishment
112
also tend to support a finding of legal malice.
A discussion of criminal liability involves a question similar to
matters previously discussed in relation to civil liability: may a
107 Taylor v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1957); Montgomery
v. Commonwealth, 23 K.L.R. 732, 63 S.W. 747 (1901); See Fabian v. State, 235
Md. 306, 201 A.2d 511, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 869 (1954).
108 Roberson v. State, 22 Ala. App. 413, 116 So. 317 (1928).
109 Id.
110 Taylor v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1957).
"' State v. Thornton, 136 N.C. 610, 48 S.E. 602 (1904).
112 Haydon v. State, 15 Ala. App. 61, 72 So. 586 (1916).
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teacher be convicted of a crime where the injury is serious only
because of some unusual physical condition of the pupil? It will
be recalled that the earlier discussion questioned some decisions
in other jurisdictions implying, contrary to the majority "thin
skull" rule, that malice is a necessary element for imposing civil
liability for excessive punishment. Here, however, that approach
should not be criticized, as the teacher should not be subject to
criminal liability by means of civil liability rules. The Texas courts
have held that a teacher inflicting otherwise reasonable and
moderate punishment will be criminally liable for injuries due to
an unusual condition of the pupil if the teacher knew or should
have known of the condition." 3 Not only does this rule fail to
adequately protect the teacher, but it also fails to comply with
basic elements of criminal law as it fails to require that some
evidence be in existence to support a finding of criminal intent.
The Texas rule would seem to be no more than the basic rule
of negligence, that is, whether the defendant knew or should
have known of a peculiar condition in the student. Thus, it is
defective, by reason of its application of civil negligence rules to
criminal prosecutions.
There are several penalties which may be inflicted in a criminal proceeding. Where death results from the crime, there are
four possibilities. First, the defendant may be found guilty of
voluntary manslaughter, the punishment for which is confinement
in the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than twentyone years." 4 A second verdict is involuntary manslaughter, an
act creating such extreme risk of death or great bodily injury as
to manifest a wanton indifference to the value of human life. This
may result in confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one
nor more than fifteen years. Thirdly, an act constituting reckless
conduct results in imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than twelve months, or a fine not exceeding $5,000, or both." 5
Fourth and finally, there are two types of prosecution for homicide. Where a person willfully strikes another without intent to
cause death, but the victim dies within six months, the possible
penalties are confinement in the penitentiary for not less than
113

Ely v. State, 68 Tex. Crim. 562, 152 S.W. 631 (1912).

114 KRS § 435.020 (1946).
115 KRS § 435.022 (1962).
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one nor more than six years.116 Willful murder is punishable by
17
confinement in the penitentiary for life, or by execution.
A conviction for criminal assault where the victim survives is
limited to the crime of assault with a deadly weapon, and it is
unlikely that such event would occur in the scholastic setting.
However, KRS § 485.160 (1962) does provide that any person
who maims another may be confined in the penitentiary for not
less than one nor more than five years. KRS § 208.020 (4) (1964)
is here applicable too. It provides:
The [Juvenile] court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
persons who, and no persons shall, willfully and unnecessarily expose to the inclemency of the weather, or in any
other manner willfully injure in health or limb any child
actually or apparently under the age of 16 years.

V.

RECOMMMDATIONS

A. A Workable Theory
Having examined in section I the traditional theories of
jurisdiction, and found them all wanting, it is appropriate to
search for a workable theory of disciplinary jurisdiction over
secondary students.
The threshold inquiry is whether any theory is needed. If we
can use Prosser's approach and simply declare that maintenance of
order is sufficient reason for allowing teachers to discipline pupils
we have said little, for two questions are left unanswered: what
behavior is punishable and how is it punishable? Doubts about
the need of a theory therefore soon fade, evolving into a more
desperate search for a workable theory.
The traditional theories explored in section I each fail because
of some disturbing criticism. The contractual theories necessarily
presume an equality of parties, which is an unsupportable presumption. A statutory theory, expository but unexplanatory, can
fully satisfy only a legal positivist. In loco parentishas been shown
to entail too many practical and technical objections to permit its
unqualified use. The quasi-judicial theory, besides being indistinct
from in loco parentis, has the unfortunate flaw of not solving
113
7

11

KRS §435.050 (1946).
KRS § 435.010 (1946).
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the problem; it provides immunity within limits without detailing
nor supplying criteria for detailing those limits. A jurisdictional
theory, to be truly useful, also must provide a basic standard by
which to measure disciplinary procedures, and tell why the school
may impose them.
The search can end with Professor Goldman's fiduciary
theory,11 8 which requires only slight modification to serve secondary schools. Under this theory, any contractual approach to
student-institution relations is abandoned in favor of basing the
law on the parties' status. The student is recognized as having a
status subordinate to the school, he having accepted this subordination on the vaguest of terms either because of his confidence in the school's fidelity and integrity or because he was
put there by some outside force, likely parents or school districting. In either event, the school dominates the student and
the very existence of this domination is cause enough to require
special standards of conduct on the schoors part; certainly a
higher degree of fairness than is exacted from participants in a
mere contract. The school undertakes to satisfy the confidence of
the student or his parents by educating the pupil.
Negatively stated, the fiduciary theory avoids the specific
criticism levied against the traditional views. While there is a
vague consensual relationship, based upon historic contracts
between the school and its students, there is nothing approaching
a contract. Nor is there any contention that the school has been
delegated mystic rights by the parent, or that the school has
stepped into a pair of ill-fitting parental shoes. Since fiduciary
status lies outside the realm of parental rights and duties, the
school becomes an entirely separate entity, having its own areas
of responsibility.
From a positive viewpoint the fiduciary theory likewise has
value. There is no distinction between public and private
schools." 9' There is imposed a general duty of fairness upon all
behavior of the fiduciary, both in enactment of rules and enforcement of them, which guarantees to the student a procedure
and a result which is consonant with concepts of due process. The
school is required to demonstrate fairness, rather than the stu118

Goldman, supra note 1.

119 Id., at 678.
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dent being required to prove the disciplinary action wrong. °
At the same time, this theory plainly imposes upon the fiduciary
the duty to protect its capacity to perform its trust function;
i.e., to educate. Thus the school may act in the best interests of
all when activities endangering the performance of its trust
function occur, regardless of the desires of one or more of the
students.
Professor Goldman's fiduciary theory need be modified only
insignificantly to be applicable to secondary schools. Since he
offers the theory for the university, he rejects the existence of any
extensive relationship between the university and parents be2
cause most university students are emancipated or of majority.'1
This, of course, does not hold for high schools. Unlike a university, secondary schools should owe duties toward the parent.
By placing comparatively young persons in its care, parents also
repose a great deal of confidence in the high school, and this confidence must not be overlooked.
Upon reflection, it is apparent that some courts have for years
used an approach not entirely unlike the fiduciary theory. While
attempting to utilize the traditional theories, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals spoke in terms of arbitrariness, malice, "other improper
motives," fraudulent purposes, unreasonableness, unlawful action
and actions against public policy. This language may just as easily
be used in a fiduciary sense. Indeed, a review of some of those
cases, in light of the fiduciary theory, yields the conclusion that
that theory would not have altered in result many of those
decisions.
The following activities are obviously regulable under the
fiduciary theory as they relate to the functioning of the schoors
duty to provide an education: insulting teachers; violating a curfew in high school dormitory where residence is required; failing
to maintain certain grades; hazing; disobedience or defiance of
teachers; failure to comply with immunization requirements of
the state; wearing such distracting or otherwise damaging things
as metal heel plates, immodest clothing, excessive consmetics and
distracting hairstyles; the exercise of first amendment freedoms
which results in disruption of the school routine; and marriage of
120 Id., at 674.
121 Id,

at 680.
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a student. The school's right to protect its capacity to perform its
trust function causes regulation in these areas to be permissible, so
long as it is shown that disturbance of the academic atmosphere
directly resulted from the behavior.
Certain other activities previously discussed may not be
properly regulable under the fiduciary theory, even though the
courts have heretofore permitted regulation. There are here two
categories: activities which may be regulable in some instances
and not in others; and those activities which, under the fiduciary
theory, should never be regulable.
Into the first category falls proscribing patronization of
restaurants off school grounds. Certainly, a rational argument
could be made in favor of requiring children to eat only in the
school restaurant if one exists. Then too, a restaurant with a poor
sanitary record might be declared off limits; for if the school did
not provide a restaurant for the children, its fiduciary duty would
encompass health protection for them. But where there are no
sanitation problems and where the school does not provide a
restaurant, it would not be permissible by the fiduciary theory to
allow school authorities to forbid students to enter particular
restaurants as there are only two conceivable reasons why school
authorities would do so: (1) because the establishment serves
alcoholic beverages, and (2) for some personal discrimination
against the restauranteur. If the restaurant serves alcohol, statutes
forbid the entrance of persons under twenty-one years of age
anyway, hence the normal legal processes could be used to control
students patronizing such a restaurant. Similarly, personal motivation certainly would fall without the scope of fiduciary responsibilities.
Other activities regulable depending on the circumstances
could easily arise under the statutory authorization for disciplinary action where the pupil acts in gross violation of law. Here
again, any violation that disrupts the academic atmosphere
would be regulable under the fiduciary theory, but it is not altogether certain that the legal authorities would restrict their
interpretation of that statutory authorization to only those violations. An example is the previously noted opinion of the Kentucky Attorney General which stated that this particular statutory
provision permitted school authorities to suspend students en-
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gaging in sexual relations. 122 If the acts took place on school
property this may be a justifiable opinion, but if they did not, they
constitute a violation of law more properly punishable by the
proper legal authorities than by academic censure. Under the
fiduciary theory, secret societies would continue to be regulable,
but only when they attempt to intrude into the school by organizing or holding meetings. They are not now regulable during nonschool months, and by the same rationale should not be regulable
even during the school year when their activities take place
entirely without the school.
Last among the matters regulable according to circumstances
is truancy. Occasional truancy may be best punished through
academic discipline. On the other hand, continuous failure to attend school cannot be halted by academic processes for which
the student already holds contempt. The latter situation should
be remedied by other legal processes.
The much smaller category is that of those activities never
regulable under the fiduciary theory. The prior holding that a
student may be disciplined for refusing to join in commencement
exercises, 23 does not seem to be a sound position under the
fiduciary theory although the court ostensibly rested its decision
upon the supposed educational value of participation in such a
program.
Since a substantial number of people smoke today, smoking
does not have the disruptive influence that it might have had at
one time, and it is therefore not altogether certain that smoking
can be forbidden on the grounds that it disturbs the academic
atmosphere of the school. Of course, smoking on school grounds
is forbidden by statute, and as such it may properly fall within
those areas regulable because they constitute a violation of law
taking place on school grounds. Yet, as noted above, the violation of law taking place on school grounds should be corrected by
school authorities only when it is related directly to the academic
function, and when it does not so relate it should be a matter for
the legal authorities.
Considering these particular decisions, it is apparent that the
1957 Op. ATr'y. GEN. 40021.
123 Valentine v. Independent School Dist., 191 Iowa 1100, 183 N.W. 434
122

(1921).
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bulk of the courts' decisions would have been the same had the
courts used the fiduciary theory. By applying such standards as
unreasonableness and arbitrariness, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has satisfied the initial requirements of the fiduciary theory.
It has also satisfied the next, more important, requirement of the
theory by demanding that all such regulations relate to the
educational purposes of the school. Nonetheless, we should not
cast upon the Court the entire burden. To a great extent the
legislature can aid in the determination of fairness by enacting
useful statutes.
B. A Legislative Model
The purpose of this section is not to restate specific criticisms
previously made, but to set forth a model for legislation designed
to correct the problems discovered.
The matter of initial concern is to set out the scheme of
disciplinary action that should prevail. First, when a student is
deemed guilty of conduct contrary to statutes or regulations of
the school board, a Superintendent, principal or head teacher of
any school should be empowered to suspend the student. Immediate notice to the pupil's parents or legal custodian and
a hearing held within one week of the suspension should be
mandatory. At the end of the hearing, the board would decide
whether to readmit the pupil or expel him. If readmitted, the
pupil should have no cause of action against school authorities
for the wrongful suspension. However, were the decree expulsion
rather than readmission, his right to judicial review should remain
unimpaired. No corporal punishment of any kind should be
permissable; but ff the misconduct were simply a matter of the
pupil having some illegal item in his possession and causing
classroom disorder through its display or use, confiscation of the
item should be permissable. And finally, for minor incidents,
detention of the pupil after school for reasonable periods should
be allowable.
This disciplinary scheme can be erected through changes of
addition rather than correction of Kentucky Statutes. KRS §
167.150 (1962) should be amended to include a provision similar
to that found in KRS § 167.170 (1962) so that no officer or employee of any school, public or private, shall be permitted to in-
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flict corporal punishment upon any pupil. The hearing by the
school board required by KRS § 158.150 (1962) should be required to be held within one week of suspension, with notice to
the student's guardian. Those granted the authority of causing
suspension of pupils would be granted statutory immunity from
any liability for wrongful suspension where the pupil so suspended is not expelled at the end of the required hearing, but
is reinstated in school. Finally, statutory authorization would
be granted to school authorities for detention for a reasonable
period of time and for confiscation from the student of items the
possession of which on school premises is forbidden by law and
causes disturbances of academic order. 24
The most obvious advantage of this system is the elimination
of any danger of physical harm to a student within the scope of
permissable punishment. The question ceases to be whether the
corporal punishment was activated by the teacher's improper
motive, and whether the injured student should recover due to
such motive, and becomes merely whether any corporal punishment was inflicted. The teacher no longer have the right
to impose physical punishment, any such punishment inflicted
upon a pupil as a means of discipline would be actionable.
Because there would be no right of discipline through corporal
punishment, and because there would be no cause of action for
wrongful suspension where a pupil is reinstated after the hearing,
there is no possibility of a civil suit or a criminal prosecution
against school authorities arising out of a claim of abuse of disciplinary discretion. Those proceedings which may arise would
allege unauthorized disciplinary action and thus not incur the
line drawing problems of degree of privilege.
The hearing required by law to follow suspension will serve
multiple purposes. All parties will have a chance to air their
grievances publicly. More importantly, there will be an open discussion of both the propriety and the enforcement of the regulation. Vague phrases such as "other gross violation of propriety"
124 The specific creation of such a disciplinary technique might at first seem
contradictory to earlier comments about the fiduciary theory; we criticized the use
of academic discipline for the regulation of crimes. But it should be noted that
this remedy affects only cases where classroom disorder has occurred from the
display or use of an illegal item.
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will be examined critically in the public light, rather than applied
discreetly behind closed doors. Also, requiring imposition of
punishment by a group rather than an individual increases the
liklihood of a rational decision, not only by the simple number
of decisionmakers, but also by the increased temperateness accompanying distance in time from the occurrence. Finally, the
hearing process will create a record facilitating greater accuracy
on appellate review. The argument that this proposal creates
unnecessary formalism is unfounded, for the same hearing is
presently required by KRS § 158.150 (1962). More importantly,
it will provide an important safeguard for the student.
Most of the arguments against this scheme will focus on the
prohibition of corporal punishment and the primary reliance
on the remedy of suspension. While it is true that mild corporal
punishment is sometimes beneficial, its primary applicability is to
pupils younger than high school students. Furthermore, while it
is true that speedy application of a paddle may provide a
quicker impression, the advantages of substituting a speedy
suspension for possible physical harm to the student are apparent.
It can, of course, be plausibly argued that suspension would
simply give uncaring students a holiday whereas swiftly applied
corporal punishment would effectively serve the needs of the
school and the student. This raises the question whether the
purpose of discipline is maintainence of order in the school so
that willing students may obtain their education, or the correction of the pupil involved. No doubt it can be argued that the
purpose is dual, involving each of these elements. Yet, where
there is a conflict between the two, fond hopes of synthesis cannot prevail and the more important element must be ascertained.
Obviously, the ultimate reason for keeping order is to enable those
wishing to gain an education to do so. Responsibility for correction of the child ultimately rests upon the parent, and a
responsive parent should be sufficiently disturbed by the suspension to himself take some action. Thus, the fact that an unruly
student might welcome a period of suspension should not be
determinative.
It cannot be argued that truly less severe means of discipline
have been prohibited by this proposal. It is true that a gentle
tap may be less severe than suspension from school for a week,
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but the danger of corporal punishment is that the physical blow
cannot be retracted once it has fallen. If that blow causes effects
more severe than were intended nothing can be done. Moreover
the proposed plan does not eliminate truly less severe means of
discipline. There remain the techniques of confiscation and detention. Furthermore, expulsion is not a necessary result of the
hearing. Readmission of the pupil is quite possible.
A final advantage of this proposal is that the law is clarified
by the codification of desired principles, and unwanted or conflicting case law on the subject is eliminated. At the same time,
the proposed plan will not affect regulations of the school board,
because the standard rules as to reasonableness would remain in
effect; and an adoption of the fiduciary theory by the Court of
Appeals would create a basic rule to govern each such regulation.
CONCLUSION

The argument can be made that there is in fact no need for a
proposal as that herein promulgated since no harm has yet
resulted from the present law and decisions. But such an argument
fails to consider the very purpose of these recommendations. The
question is not whether evil has occurred, but rather whether
there is a distinct possibility of its occurrence. The criticisms
leveled at the existing system reveal that abuse of a teacher's
privilege of reasonable corporal punishment is quite possible, and
that such a possibility should be eliminated, not just for the
well-being of pupils, but for the good of the teacher as well. These
recommendations make no distinction between public and private
secondary schools for that very reason. There may be a greater
applicability of the contractual theory to relations among private
schools and parents, but merely ascertaining the theory that can
best be used to justify discipline is not the point of this article.
No parent would accept the results of excessive punishment with
a contractual shrug, and no teacher should be deprived of the
protection afforded by this plan simply because he teaches in a
private school.
Nearly every day, a fresh article appears in a newspaper
describing a student protest of some sort. Lately, however, high
school students have been conspicuous in those articles. The
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United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case
involving haircuts, and today's hairstyles make it certain that for
every Supreme Court case there must be hundreds of unreported
local incidents involving appearance. But secondary school students are learning the advantages of public protest, or at least
the publicity of protest, and more will be heard from them.
The deficiencies herein observed in present law will become
glaringly visible all too soon.

